Here is an article I wrote for Catholic Thought
----------- Ricardo Milla
Kant proposes a moral [1] founded on duty, what is done by a simple imperative of reason excluding any inclination. According to this, "Whoever visits a sick friend just because you ordered a duty, act morally [good], who is visiting a friend just because you're so inclined friendship, and because it rejoices, certainly acts of conformity to duty, "but no" duty "[2], and thus acts morally wrong.
could analyze from this perspective, the case of the Good Samaritan, [3] proposed by Christ as a paradigm of charity. [4] The Samaritan of the parable, moved by compassion and also, obviously, for the love, assistance Man assaulted as they left "almost dead. " This would be for Kant an act morally wrong, because in this case should act on the duty of helping the needy and not for any inclination.
Rhonheimer tells us: "Kantian ethics is not a virtue ethics. And being a pure ethic of duty, demands of reason, the taming of a wicked and selfish nature through reason, it seems that necessarily leaves out the essence of morality. "[5]
The proposed ethics of virtues comes to meet the ethics of duty. A virtue ethics poses take well before the duty, because duty is taken when something or act is seen as good. It follows that the trial "[...] "P is my duty" is not simply the view of reason "p is really good". "[6]
What Kant aims to do is isolate a practical reason for all emotional inclination - hedonistically speaking, because they understand-and thereby ensure an alternate building to have some criterion by which to determine good. "That's what happens when you know you might think or want a universal law the maxim that you should visit the sick friends, and therefore I am" forced "to do it." [7] In this case I'm not thinking the sake of my friend, I'm thinking it is, at least in this.
worth noting that Aristotle agrees with Kant that the duty has to do with "the imperatives of reason." Kant would say, however, that these are only hypothetical imperatives Aristotelian, ie, "referring to what is useful to achieve the purpose of her happiness." [8] However, there has been so right about this.
Take the example of visiting the sick friend from an Aristotelian perspective. That person is going to see a friend who is ill with a "tilt friendly" is that action as well because "his will has the act of benevolence", [9] so you want to his friend, the good and the best here and now [10] (in this case, a visit). For Aristotle it is proper to a man of value, namely, the frónimoz: [11] to visit a friend because he loves and it is good for him is certainly an act of kindness, and given this man wants the good and the best for your friend, this act was full of joy.
But where is the duty in that instance? Has apparently disappeared. However, still present, because only be revealed as "pure duty when the rational and the inclination to follow different directions." [12] In addition, the virtuous man is one who having "the most awareness of high duty, "[13] acts, however, for the joy that makes you do good and the performance you get from this, so less is acting out of duty.
But about decisions taken in Kantian ethics. Left by Christ's commandments as "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" [14] or "love each other as I have loved you", [15] would be for Kant, indeed, a duty and that alone. And is that for Kant, love is a feeling incapable of being the engine of a morally good act. However, it forgets that there is a dimension in the development of the encounter between God and man in which he reveals that throughout history, giving visible signs of his love, going to meet. This makes clear that love is not merely a sentiment. "Feelings come and go. Can be a wonderful spark, but not the fullness of love. "[16] Precisely because of this, because love is not just a feeling, you may become mandated, because" He [God] first loved us and continues to love us first, so we can respond with love "[17] and is a must because we see, from the right, to love your neighbor and God is good, and therefore deem it a duty, not On the contrary, as proposed by Kant.
St. Thomas Aquinas says that "[...] the rule of law is an act that requires action. The rule or measure of human action is the reason, since it corresponds to order the end, the good. "[18] So things:" The subject of action is bound by whatever the reason appears as well in the trial of action. "[19] Furthermore:" The obligation is not nothing but the volition of what is known by reason as well. The duty is to tilt according to reason [...]. "[20]
Finally, it is necessary for Kant" the postulate of the existence of God, as we can understand ultimately a moral obligation. Thus, states: "[...] the idea of \u200b\u200bGod is made by ourselves to serve as a spring in our behavior: having a religion is the duty of man." [21] Comparing these approaches with an ethic of virtues, it is clear that the latter does not need to reduce God to a postulate: the well must be "made and attempted," ie, the object of moral reasoning extends to our comprehensive fulfillment, for that matter, no cripples our emotions but the way, driving our soul and body, maybe, finally, the encounter with God.
With the above, it is clear that Kant raises an ethical duty aside any inclination, [22] and it is much more legitimate than the same duty. It bears repeating that for us, the duty is assumed when viewed by the right, in other words, since this is good, I must. who proposes a virtue ethics tell you what moves man to act is the intrinsic good of what is inteligibiliza as good, the man acted out of habit and virtue (arete), and in particular the highest of these, charity (agape), which Aquinas defines as true and unconditional friendship.
learn from Santa Maria, a paradigm of love and service, to hear from the lips of His holy divine messenger cousin Elizabeth was pregnant, [23] came hurrying to assist with an attitude of generosity and moved by love, [24] without thinking about whether it was his duty.
could analyze from this perspective, the case of the Good Samaritan, [3] proposed by Christ as a paradigm of charity. [4] The Samaritan of the parable, moved by compassion and also, obviously, for the love, assistance Man assaulted as they left "almost dead. " This would be for Kant an act morally wrong, because in this case should act on the duty of helping the needy and not for any inclination.
Rhonheimer tells us: "Kantian ethics is not a virtue ethics. And being a pure ethic of duty, demands of reason, the taming of a wicked and selfish nature through reason, it seems that necessarily leaves out the essence of morality. "[5]
The proposed ethics of virtues comes to meet the ethics of duty. A virtue ethics poses take well before the duty, because duty is taken when something or act is seen as good. It follows that the trial "[...] "P is my duty" is not simply the view of reason "p is really good". "[6]
What Kant aims to do is isolate a practical reason for all emotional inclination - hedonistically speaking, because they understand-and thereby ensure an alternate building to have some criterion by which to determine good. "That's what happens when you know you might think or want a universal law the maxim that you should visit the sick friends, and therefore I am" forced "to do it." [7] In this case I'm not thinking the sake of my friend, I'm thinking it is, at least in this.
worth noting that Aristotle agrees with Kant that the duty has to do with "the imperatives of reason." Kant would say, however, that these are only hypothetical imperatives Aristotelian, ie, "referring to what is useful to achieve the purpose of her happiness." [8] However, there has been so right about this.
Take the example of visiting the sick friend from an Aristotelian perspective. That person is going to see a friend who is ill with a "tilt friendly" is that action as well because "his will has the act of benevolence", [9] so you want to his friend, the good and the best here and now [10] (in this case, a visit). For Aristotle it is proper to a man of value, namely, the frónimoz: [11] to visit a friend because he loves and it is good for him is certainly an act of kindness, and given this man wants the good and the best for your friend, this act was full of joy.
But where is the duty in that instance? Has apparently disappeared. However, still present, because only be revealed as "pure duty when the rational and the inclination to follow different directions." [12] In addition, the virtuous man is one who having "the most awareness of high duty, "[13] acts, however, for the joy that makes you do good and the performance you get from this, so less is acting out of duty.
But about decisions taken in Kantian ethics. Left by Christ's commandments as "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" [14] or "love each other as I have loved you", [15] would be for Kant, indeed, a duty and that alone. And is that for Kant, love is a feeling incapable of being the engine of a morally good act. However, it forgets that there is a dimension in the development of the encounter between God and man in which he reveals that throughout history, giving visible signs of his love, going to meet. This makes clear that love is not merely a sentiment. "Feelings come and go. Can be a wonderful spark, but not the fullness of love. "[16] Precisely because of this, because love is not just a feeling, you may become mandated, because" He [God] first loved us and continues to love us first, so we can respond with love "[17] and is a must because we see, from the right, to love your neighbor and God is good, and therefore deem it a duty, not On the contrary, as proposed by Kant.
St. Thomas Aquinas says that "[...] the rule of law is an act that requires action. The rule or measure of human action is the reason, since it corresponds to order the end, the good. "[18] So things:" The subject of action is bound by whatever the reason appears as well in the trial of action. "[19] Furthermore:" The obligation is not nothing but the volition of what is known by reason as well. The duty is to tilt according to reason [...]. "[20]
Finally, it is necessary for Kant" the postulate of the existence of God, as we can understand ultimately a moral obligation. Thus, states: "[...] the idea of \u200b\u200bGod is made by ourselves to serve as a spring in our behavior: having a religion is the duty of man." [21] Comparing these approaches with an ethic of virtues, it is clear that the latter does not need to reduce God to a postulate: the well must be "made and attempted," ie, the object of moral reasoning extends to our comprehensive fulfillment, for that matter, no cripples our emotions but the way, driving our soul and body, maybe, finally, the encounter with God.
With the above, it is clear that Kant raises an ethical duty aside any inclination, [22] and it is much more legitimate than the same duty. It bears repeating that for us, the duty is assumed when viewed by the right, in other words, since this is good, I must. who proposes a virtue ethics tell you what moves man to act is the intrinsic good of what is inteligibiliza as good, the man acted out of habit and virtue (arete), and in particular the highest of these, charity (agape), which Aquinas defines as true and unconditional friendship.
learn from Santa Maria, a paradigm of love and service, to hear from the lips of His holy divine messenger cousin Elizabeth was pregnant, [23] came hurrying to assist with an attitude of generosity and moved by love, [24] without thinking about whether it was his duty.
Ricardo A. Milla Toro Student of Philosophy
is also found in: http://pensamientocatolico.blogspot.com/2007/05/la-obligacin-moral-y-el and duty-kantiano.html
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----- [1] For this work to refer to Martin Rhonheimer in the moral perspective. Philosophical foundations of ethics (Rialp: Madrid, 2000, chapter V "structures of rationality", Part 2 "Science and moral consciousness", point c) "The moral obligation and its basis theonomist", pp. 324-328).
----- [1] For this work to refer to Martin Rhonheimer in the moral perspective. Philosophical foundations of ethics (Rialp: Madrid, 2000, chapter V "structures of rationality", Part 2 "Science and moral consciousness", point c) "The moral obligation and its basis theonomist", pp. 324-328).
[2] Ibid., P. 324.
[3] Lk 10, 29-37.
[4] Later I'll try what can be deduced from Kantian ethics on the mandate of love.
[5] Rhonheimer, op. cit., p. 325.
[6] Ibid., P. 326.
[7] Lug. cit.
[8] Ibid., P. 325.
[9] Lug. cit.
[10] Namely, the Aristotelian practical syllogism: Since this is the good and the best, and good and the best here and now is this, then I do (Prasse). See Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (Eth. Nic.), Z 12, 1144th 31-32.
[11] The wise, the virtuous.
[12] Rhonheimer, op. cit., p. 325.
[13] Ibid., P. 327.
[14] Mt 22, 39.
[15] See Jn 13, 34.
[16] See Pope Benedict XVI. Deus Caritas Est. Encyclical Letter. Lima: Pauline-Epiconsa, 2006, n. 17.
[17] Lug. cit.
[18] St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, q. 90, a. 1.
[19] Rhonheimer, op. cit., p. 326.
[20] Ibid., P. 327.
[21] Lug. cit. See E. Kant, MS, A 109 (IV, pp. 579 et seq.)
[22] It seems that Hume understood well that, unlike Kant, namely: "If it was not natural affection a duty, the care of children could not be a duty and, if possible, could keep in mind the duty of care we offer our children "(David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Selby-Bigge, p. 478 [Trad. cast.: Treatise of human nature. Madrid: Tecnos, 1988]).
[23] See Luke 1: 36.
[24] See Luke 1, 39-40.
